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This article is part of a larger project that seeks to understand the 
conditions of possibility of different forms of social science knowledge. 
The time frame is what Giovanni Arrighi (1994) has called “the long 20th 
century” and what Neil Smith (2003) refers to as “the American century” -  
the period from the late 19th to the early 21st century, during which the US 
first rose and then fell from the position of the world’s leading power. In the 
larger project, I suggest that the social sciences in the US are inextricably 
linked to the process of empire formation, and that they may be divided into 
three periods, each of which corresponds to a shift in the relationship between 
the US and its imperial domains. These three periods are: (1) The Formation 
of Empire (circa 1900-1940; in particular, the period between WW I and 
WW II); (2) The Consolidation of Empire (circa 1945-1975); and (3) The 
Reconstitution of Empire (circa 1975-the Present).
During each of these periods, I argue, the social sciences have been 
characterized by a distinctive “geography of enquiry”. Area studies — the 
geographic mode of the cold war period — is the best known of these, 
although the other two also have their own distinct geographic frames. 
Each of these geographies of knowledge, I seek to show, has been enabled 
by an historically contingent assemblage (Collier and Ong, 2005) of 
institutional practices and relationships. One of my goals is to focus attention 
on how and why these global assemblages came into being, and in this was 
to better understand the powers and interests involved in authorizing different 
forms of social science knowledge.
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The emphasis of the present paper is a little-known but important 
subject. I focus on the collaboration of the military and the academy during 
WW II to produce the first comprehensive version of area studies -  a 
geography of knowledge well-suited to the military’s desire to impose control 
upon and stability within the extensive territories being “liberated” from 
Axis control. Before turning to the fruit of this military/academic collaboration, 
however, I review briefly the geography of knowledge that emerged prior 
to WW II. Such a contrast will highlight not only the degree to which war­
time area studies represented a radical break with what had come before. It 
will also point to the distinctive institutions, powers and interests involved in 
producing knowledge during these two periods.
The Consolidation of Empire: the Social Sciences between the World 
Wars
During the opening decades of the 20th century -  and especially between 
the two world wars -  a new kind of social science research came into 
being. Unlike the arm chair theorizing that dom inated past academic 
endeavors, the “new” social science was problem-oriented and observation- 
based. Between the world wars, for the first time literally thousands of 
young men and women began doing primary research -  both field and archive- 
based. Although the range of topics upon which they focused their energies 
was quite broad, the research of this era had an important commonality. It 
was intended by its sponsors to have some bearing on understanding the 
pressing socio-economic and political problems of the day.
The “new” social science was brought into being largely by the great 
philanthropic foundations located in the United States of America. Rockefeller 
and Carnegie took the leading role, although Russell Sage, Rosenthall, Phelps 
Stokes and others also played important parts. As the foundations stated 
openly and explicitly, they were deeply troubled by the negative impact that 
the expansion of trade and industry was having on diverse peoples and 
societies located around the globe. The foundations sought to understand 
why this was occurring, and wished to ameliorate the worst of the negative 
impacts. In this way they hoped to promote and expand the benefits of
SOCIAL SCIENCE KNOWLEDGE AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
34
capitalist modernity, a project to which they were deeply committed. This 
was considered an especially pressing matter in light of the Russian Revolution 
of 1917, the spread of international communism, and the emergence of 
numerous, powerful anti-colonial movements.
The foundations turned to the university, and secondarily to the 
private research institute, as the institutional site where their goals could 
best be pursued. They turned to the university-based academic as the 
source of expertise best suited to gathering the information they sought. 
The foundations believed that before either was ready to perform the tasks 
required of them, however, extensive changes in both would have to be 
made. Universities were oriented predominantly toward teaching, and faculty 
had neither opportunity nor motivation to engage in primary research. Nor 
did they have the extensive blocks of uninterrupted time necessary to 
produce in-depth works of scholarship. Nor were they trained in the 
problem-oriented, observation-based methods the foundations believed to 
be essential to their cause.
In an effort to mold academia in the desired directions, the foundations 
intervened extensively in the organizations of universities and in the training 
and activities of academics. The philanthropies poured huge sums of money 
into approximately thirty select universities -  the majority in the US, but 
some in Europe and a few beyond it -  to showcase their efforts. Some of 
the funds were used to relieve the teaching pressure on professors, and to 
provide them with free time to pursue research and writing. Other monies 
were made available to sponsor actual research projects that dealt with the 
pressing social problems that were the focus of foundation concern -  and 
that took academics directly to the contested frontiers and internal lines of 
fracture of capitalist modernity. Philanthropic largesse was also used to 
train academics in problem-oriented methodology and observation-based 
techniques of data collection.
The foundations also provided monies to train graduate studies along 
similar lines, and to allow them to do their own primary research. The 
philanthropies were equally committed to increasing the overall number of 
graduate studies, and to opening graduate study to form erly under­
represented groups. These included members of the domestic middle and 
working classes. They included as well gifted students from beyond Western
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Europe and the US -  from China, India, Africa, Latin America and the Middle 
East -  who were brought to be trained at the foundations’ re-made elite 
universities. In this way the foundations hoped to form an international 
academic elite trained in and committed to the problem-oriented, observation- 
based approach to social engineering that the foundations believed essential 
to their cause.
In addition to transforming the conditions of academic life within a 
select group o f elite universities, the philanthropies also created new 
organizations to coordinate and guide the activities of all universities -  
especially those in the US. They did so in large part by creating national 
institutions (especially the SSRC, the ACLS and the National Research 
Council) that funded the kind of research they sought to promote, the kind 
of researcher they sought to reward, and the kind of training they sought to 
provide. These institutions became the most important sources of funding 
for social science research and training during the entire period in question.
In addition to reorganizing academic life within universities, the 
foundations also focused their attention on private research institutes. In 
some cases, the philanthropies created entirely new institutes out of whole 
cloth. An example here would be the Institute of Pacific Relations, which 
organized and funded research and publishing about a wide range of issues 
in what today would be called the Pacific Rim and large sections of SE Asia 
(Akami, 2002). The foundations also reorganized and re-oriented the activities 
and priorities of existing institutes so that they would promote the kinds of 
research and scholarship to which the foundations were committed. An 
example here would be the RIAA -  the Royal Institute of International Affairs
-  whose headquarters were in London. Under philanthropic guidance, the 
RIIA coordinated research and writing on a wide range of topics, from the 
economic and political conditions of colonial Africa (Hailey, 1938) to the 
dynamics of the world communist movement (Toynbee, 1928).
All in all, during the inter-war period the foundations created an entire 
infrastructure of social science training, research and publishing. An 
assemblage that was truly global in scope, this infrastructure was made up 
of an extensive network of universities, private research institutes, training 
programs and publishing venues the complete dimensions of which have 
yet to be fully documented. For the present purposes, however, the important 
point about this infrastructure is the following; it underwrote virtually all
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social science research and publishing in the English-speaking world. It also 
made the US the intellectual and institutional center of the social sciences, 
and placed the US at the focal point of an emerging global public sphere of 
social science knowledge.
A review of the scholarship produced during this period as a whole 
(as opposed to the works of a few famous authors) reveals that the 
foundations were concerned about problems and processes -  labor migration, 
capital investm ent, epidem ic disease, poverty, colonialism , fascism, 
international com m unism  -  rather than territories or boundaries. By 
understanding and ameliorating the worst of the period’s social problems, 
the foundations hoped to maintain a world without borders -  one that would 
be safe for capital and consumption, and safe from communism and 
international socialism. The problem-oriented, observation-based forms of 
knowledge they did so much to create reflected these concerns.1
A War-Time Geography of Knowledge: the Military and Area Studies 
during World War II
This processual, globally-oriented, field-based approach to applied, 
practical problems transformed in fundamental ways as a result of WW II, 
when a new geography of knowledge came into being. The new knowledge 
geography may be distinguished from the old in a number of ways. First, it 
emerged in radically transformed global conditions -  the heat of industrial 
w arfare (cf. Lutz, 2004), waged am ong the con tend ing  cap ita lis t 
superpowers of the era. It was also enabled by different bodies -  an assemblage 
that was predominantly military/academic as opposed to corporate/academic. 
Third, in its field dimensions, the new knowledge geography was implemented 
by d ifferent personnel -  academ ically trained soldiers and civilian 
professionals rather than field-readied academics. Finally, the new geography 
of knowledge was intended to serve a very different set of needs, and to 
address a different group of concerns. It is to a consideration of these that 
we now turn.
1. See Nugent (2002) for a more detailed discussion of these processes.
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During WW II, the US Army did not seek knowledge about global 
processes that threatened to stir up potentially dangerous peoples living along 
the external frontiers and the internal lines of fracture of an expanding capitalist 
order. Instead, the military was in need of a single, overarching conceptual 
framework that would facilitate direct territorial administration of diverse 
peoples living in scattered, war-torn areas. As the war progressed, the Army 
found itself responsible for governing many of the far-flung regions of the 
globe that were being seized (“liberated”, in the lingo of the Allies) from the 
Axis powers. The military sought a form of knowledge that would assist in 
its efforts to govern these areas -  that would allow its soldier-administrators 
to know the territories for which they would be responsible before they 
actually began governing them, and that would make it possible for these 
soldier-administrators to deepen their understanding as they governed. In 
other words, military planners sought a form of knowledge that would equip 
soldiers with conceptual armature they could use to effect the day-to-day 
administration of occupied territories.
It was in this context that a war-time version of area studies was 
born -  one overseen by high-ranking military officers, designed and taught 
by academics, and implemented around the globe by military personnel 
(together with civilian professionals-turned-officers). By the end of the war, 
this version of area studies had been employed in the armed forces’ efforts 
to order and administer the lives of over 300 million people around the globe
-  more than 10% of the world’s population (Holborn, 1947: xi).
This iteration of area studies -  the first to be institutionalized in the 
US -  did more than simply guide the armed forces in their interim efforts to 
govern foreign lands. It also acted as the model for the academic version of 
area studies that consolidated during the Cold War.2 Indeed, the origins of
2. The fact that the entire area studies framework represented a significant change of 
direction for the social sciences is revealed by the following; from its creation (by 
Rockefeller philanthropy) in 1924 until 1943, the SSRC -  which organized the vast 
majority of all social science research in the US -  showed virtually no interest in “culture 
areas”. The committees of the SSRC covered a wide range of topics -  from “Consumption 
and Leisure,” to “Social and Economic Research in Agriculture”, to “Interracial Relations” 
(SSRC, 1934; see also the annual reports of the SSRC between 1934 and 1943). During 
this entire twenty-year period, however, only once (from 1926 to 1928) was there a 
Committee on Culture Areas (SSRC, 1934:37). The SSRC, and the social science community 
it helped create, was focused on problems and issues rather than areas and cultures.
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peace-time area studies, and the academy’s concern with cultures and areas, 
can be traced directly to WW II, to the same problems that generated the 
military’s concern with these issues. The processes to be discussed here thus 
have relevance for understanding how the social sciences have been ordered 
and conceptualized for much of the period since the beginning of WW II.
Early in the war, US military planners began to envision a new global 
geography of power and knowledge -  one that had little in common with 
the web of interconnected processes and practical problems of such pressing 
concern to the corporate-based philanthropies (and to academics) just a 
short time before. The war-time geography of the military emerged first in 
the realm of the imagination, for it began to take shape well before the 
outcome of the war was certain. Nonetheless, Allied military planners began 
to imagine a globe liberated from the Axis powers. They began to plan for 
the possibility that they would soon find themselves in control of extensive 
territories in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Pacific still controlled by the enemy.3
The US was not prepared for such an eventuality. Unlike the European 
countries, which had established extensive colonial empires long before 
WW II, the US had only rarely imposed direct political control over foreign 
lands.4 As a result, it had no ready-made cohort of colonial administrators 
to whom military planners could turn for assistance. Nor had the US had 
any reason to establish programs of training comparable to those of the 
British, the French or the Dutch -  who had consciously designed programs 
to prepare people for roles in colonial administration. As a result, US military 
planners were compelled to establish new schools and to design new 
programs of study, where soldiers could be trained for the novel task that 
appeared to lie ahead.
3. It was in England where the Allies first began to anticipate a new geography of political 
relations. European governments in exile, having fled to London before the advancing 
forces of the 3rd Reich, signed agreements with the British. According to the terms of 
these accords, once Germany had been expelled the British armed forces were to administer 
the “civil affairs” of the countries in question in an interim capacity, until the governments 
in exile could return to their home territories. The British signed agreements of this kind 
with Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Denmark.
4. The main exceptions were those territories seized from Spain at the conclusion of the 
Spanish-American War.
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It was in this context that a new geography of knowledge came into 
being. Unlike that of the pre-war era, this new geography showed a highly 
developed concern with the administration of territories -  no doubt because 
control of territory was the central point of contention in the war itself, and 
could only be established through violent clashes with the enemy. The new 
knowledge geography was equally concerned with the socio-political 
processes that took place within the boundaries of territories seized from 
the enemy -  and with ensuring that these processes were a source of order 
rather than conflict in the context of military government. Indeed, the ability 
to control the borders of liberated territories, to understand their internal 
socio-cultural dynamics, and to maintain stability within these borders, were 
matters of strategic, military concern. The geography of knowledge that 
emerged during the war was thus focused on the problems of order and 
governance within carefully delimited territorial spaces.
The development of plans to train personnel for military government 
evolved as did the war itself. In early spring of 1942, the Provost Marshal 
General of the US Army was charged with training several hundred Army 
officers for military government duty in occupied territory. He was guided 
in his efforts by the experiences of officers who had performed this same 
function in Germany after WWI. These soldiers had found themselves wholly 
unprepared for the task of government administration in occupied lands. On 
the one hand, they were completely uninformed about the economic patterns, 
social institutions, political practices, religious beliefs and cultural mores of 
the people they were to administer. As a result, they had no idea how people 
were accustomed to living -  and therefore how their attachments to familiar 
patterns of life might affect their responses to military government. Making 
matters worse, US officers had no German language skills, and thus were 
unable to educate themselves about these matters in the process of governing. 
They could not even communicate with the people under their jurisdiction 
(Coles and Weinberg, 1964; Herge, 1948).
The military concluded that it was essential to address these problems 
if they were to prepare soldiers adequately for military government during 
WW II. They were especially concerned to avoid repeating the mistakes of
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the last war because, in the military’s estimation, WW II was more “ideological” 
than the Great War (Friedrich, 1948; Holbom, 1947). Indeed, it was as if the 
worst fears of the philanthropies from the 1920s and 1930s had been realized. 
Despite their best efforts, it had proved impossible to maintain a “world without 
borders”. Enemy governments and their respective populations in many parts 
of the world had become deeply committed to communism, socialism, fascism 
and anti-colonial nationalism -  which made them extremely hostile to the US. 
Military government was therefore likely to be even more difficult than it had 
been in the non-ideological past.
To ensure that US personnel were fully up to the task that (might!) 
lay before them, a School of Military Government was established at the 
University of Virginia, in Charlottesville, in May of 1942. Later that same 
year a separate Division of Military Government was created in the office of 
the Provost Marshal General. In March of the following year, an entire Civil 
Affairs Division was established in the War Department, and under its 
auspices programs of study were launched at several hundred colleges and 
universities across the US. The purpose of this expanding network of 
institutions was twofold: (1) to train military personnel who could govern 
effectively in territories as they were seized from the Axis powers; and (2) 
to prepare soldiers in the numbers required to administer the vast sections 
of the globe where military government personnel were likely to be needed.
As envisioned by the Armed Forces, the administration of areas 
formerly under Axis control would be overseen by “civil affairs teams”, 
divided hierarchically into three groups. A cadre of specially trained officers, 
who would attend the School of Military Government at the University of 
Virginia, would be in command. They were “destined mostly for assignments 
at the higher military headquarters set up to govern states, zones, or large 
districts of occupied territory” (Grace, 1947: vi).
Beneath these high-ranking, commissioned officers in the hierarchy 
of military government was a second group -  civilian professionals and 
people in possession of specialized, essential skills that were likely to be in 
short supply in war-torn areas. This group -  medical doctors, nurses, 
engineers, lawyers, public safety personnel, individuals with experience in 
public administration etc. -  would attend a Civil Affairs Training School
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(CATS), either in Charlottesville, or at one of ten universities scattered 
around the US. The CATS program would prepare personnel for positions 
in the field, as opposed to in headquarters; CATS graduates were to be 
responsible for implementing military government in relatively small 
territorial districts (Grace, 1947: vi).
Both groups of officers would be assisted by a larger group of enlisted 
men, who would attend the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) at 
one of 227 colleges and universities (Keefer, 1988). This program provided 
soldiers with elementary training in medicine, engineering, agronomy, 
veterinary science, surveying, communications, psychology -  which would 
allow them to assist the more highly-skilled, CATS-trained personnel.5 
Together, graduates of the CATS and the ASTP would possess skills and 
training that would make them indispensable to effective military government 
in occupied territories.6
5. There was a basic and advanced curriculum of the ASTP. The former offered training in 
surveying, the internal combustion engine, communications, and acoustics & optics 
(Matthew, 1947:186). The advanced curriculum provided training in chemical engineering, 
civil engineering, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, petroleum engineering, 
sanitary engineering, transportation, marine transportation, organization and supply, 
medicine, dentistry, veterinary science, personnel psychology, and area and culture (Ibid).
6. Colonel Herman Beukema, a professor of history and government at West Point, was 
named director o f the Army Specialized Training Division, in which the ASTP was 
housed. He appointed Arthur L.H. Rubin, “a civilian who had previously directed the 
Institute of Military Studies at the University of Chicago ... [to bel chief of the ASTP’s 
Curricula and Standards Branch” (Keefer, 1988:40-41). “fW]ith help from the ASTD 
Advisory Committee, fhe] was largely responsible for determining the general content of 
the courses com prising each branch of study” (Ibid:41-44). “The ASTD Advisory 
Committee consisted o f ’ Isaiah Bowman, president, Johns Hopkins University; Robert E. 
Doherty, president, Carnegie Institute of Technology; Clarence A. Dykstra, president. 
University of Wisconsin; Guy Stanton Ford, secretary, American Historical Association’ 
the Very Reverend Robert I Gannon, president, Fordham University; Ralph D. Hetzel, 
president, Pennsylvania State College; Felix Morley, president, Haverford College; John 
J. Tigert, president, University of Florida; Ray Lyman Wilbur, chancellor, Stanford 
University; and Karl Taylor Compton, president, Massachusetts Institute of Technology” 
(Keefer, 1988:44, note).
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Graduates of the CATS and the ASTP would be assisted by a third 
group —  a special branch of ASTP-trained personnel. These individuals 
were to complete the military’s Foreign Area and Language Program (FALP), 
at one of 55 institutions of higher learning in the US. The FALP provided its 
graduates with intensive training in the cultures and languages of the areas 
they were to administer. Originally conceived of as military police, FALP 
personnel were to be trained in police procedure as well as in the cultural 
characteristics and com m unicative practices of subject populations 
(Hyneman, 1945:435-36).7 Unlike the graduates of the School of Military 
Government, and to a lesser extent the graduates of the CATS, foreign- 
area-and-language-trained ASTP soldiers were to be the rank-and-file of 
military government -  the on-the-ground personnel who would interact 
intimately with local populations on a day-to-day basis.
The armed forces conceived of graduates of the FALP as a kind of 
cultural police force, who would enforce the terms of military rule in the 
specific areas they had been trained to administer, informed by their 
background in culture and language. The occupational police, however, were 
not the only personnel to receive anthropological training. The Foreign Area 
and Language curriculum was also an integral part of the CATS program -  
which prepared mid-level government administrators. In this way the military 
sought to ensure that personnel who would have the most direct contact 
with subject populations had a strong grounding in the cultural characteristics 
of the areas they were to govern. The armed forces also sought to ensure 
that soldiers who would be responsible for the actual implementation of 
military government would be able to communicate effectively with the 
populations under their jurisdiction.
7. In practice, relatively few of these individuals ended up being trained in police procedure 
(Hyneman, 1945:435). The military chose Harold W. Stoke, then professor of political 
science and acting dean of the graduate school at the University of Wisconsin, to lead the 
effort to design the FALP curriculum (Hyneman, 1945:438). He “gathered around himself 
a half dozen men representing a wide range of interests in the study of contemporary 
civilizations and the group worked out a standard curriculum for the study of foreign 
areas” (Ibid).
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The architects of military government believed that it was essential to 
familiarize their soldier-administrators with the linguistic conventions and the 
cultural patterns that characterized specific peoples and areas -  in the belief 
that this knowledge would prove invaluable in efforts to establish sound, stable, 
m ilitary governm ent. If  civil affairs personnel were to be effective 
administrators, it was of course essential that they be educated as thoroughly 
as possible about these matters, and that real experts provide their training.
To provide soldiers with the requisite training in language, the military 
looked to the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS). Mortimer 
Graves, the ACLS Administrative Secretary, had already developed what the 
armed forces viewed as a very effective Intensive Language Program (ILP)
— one that drew on immersion techniques developed by Franz Boas and 
Edward Sapir. By the time the military became interested in language training 
(in the fall of 1942), Graves’ Intensive Language Program was already in 
place in 18 colleges and universities around the US, and was providing 
instruction in 25 different languages, few of which had ever been taught 
before (Hyneman, 1945:436-37). To make the ILP suitable for the armed 
forces, the Division of Military Government made Graves its consultant and 
put him in charge of designing a curriculum that could be used in the ASTP 
and CATS programs (Hyneman, 1945:437-38).
It proved more difficult, however, to provide soldiers with training in 
culture areas, as the military found existing academic programs inadequate 
to the task at hand. As a result, the Chief of the Military Government Division 
gathered together a group of distinguished social scientists -  anthropologists, 
sociologists, geographers, economists, psychologists, political scientists and 
historians -  and asked them to formulate a curriculum to guide instructional 
efforts in the CATS and the ASTP (Fenton, 1945:696). In relatively short 
order, this group designed the curriculum in question -  one to be used in 
preparing civil affairs personnel for the task of military government in all 
foreign areas. It was referred to as the Foreign Area and Language Program 
(FALP) curriculum.
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The program of training designed by this interdisciplinary team of 
scholars was intended to school CATS-and ASTP-trained soldiers in the 
logic of what might be called “military governmentality”. Graduates learned 
that, as military governors, their primary responsibility was to ensure the 
health and well-being of the populations for which they were responsible. 
To do so, however, soldiers were taught that they needed to restore stability 
and maintain order within the war-torn areas they were to administer. It 
was this combination of concerns that led to the emergence of a new 
geography of knowledge.8
Civil affairs teams were trained to take a series of steps to ensure the 
well-being of the population. The first order of business was to ensure that 
military control of the area had been fully established, and that its borders 
were secure. Once the territorial integrity of the area had been assured, civil 
affairs personnel could go about the task of establishing military government 
and investigating socio-cultural patterns within those borders. As soon as 
an area had been “liberated” they were to start their work immediately. They 
were to begin by announcing their presence to the local population, and by 
explaining that they would be acting as an interim government. Their next 
step was determined by the nature of their FALP training, which had been
8. Unless otherwise noted, the following section of the paper is distilled from the following 
sources, all of which are available through the General Staff Intelligence Division of the 
US War Department (G-2 Division):
—“History of Training, Military Government” (1 volume; see United States War Department 
n.d.a).
—“A History of the Army Specialized Training Program (from its inception to 31 December
1944)” (1 volume; see United States War Department n.d.b).
—“History of Training, Army Specialized Training Program (1 January 1945 to 30 June
1945)” (1 volume; see United States War Department n.d.c),
—“The Training History of the Military Intelligence Service Language Schools” (17 volu­
mes; see United States War Department 1949).
The standardized curriculum of the Foreign Area and Language Program can be found in, 
Division Memorandum Training Circular No. 2, April 10, 1943, prepared by the Military 
Government Division, Office o f the Provost Marshal General, Army Service Forces; see 
United States Armed Forces n.d.a).
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of limited duration (a maximum of nine months), and had been designed not 
to fill their heads with facts but to make them aware of what problems to 
investigate in the field. Building on what they had learned in the classroom, 
the soldier-administrators were to do a detailed inventory of virtually every 
aspect of the area assigned to them (M atthew, 1947:81-82). These 
investigations were to provide a comprehensive overview of the state of 
affairs in that region, and were also to suggest how everyday life had been 
organized prior to the war.
Civil affairs teams were to note, for example, the distribution and 
extent of the area’s natural features, including its water sources, soil types, 
mineral resources, zones of crop production and areas not suitable for 
cultivation. They were also to survey and evaluate the state of the region’s 
infrastructure —  especially its roads, bridges, railroads, irrigation works, 
canals, hospitals and airfields. Civil affairs teams were also to do careful 
inventories of all supplies of food, water, clothing, shelter and medicine 
(cf. Italian Campaigns, 1943-45:539). They were also to pay careful 
attention to features of the local population -  to its size and distribution, to 
birth and death rates, and to all conditions, natural and social, that resulted 
in undue mortality. The members of the interim government were also to 
observe whether the population was sedentary or migratory; if the latter, 
they were to note the locales between which and the numbers in which 
the population moved.
Civil affairs teams were also to make detailed observations concerning 
the main social groupings of the areas assigned to them. They were to focus 
on linguistic, racial and religious distinctions, and on differentiation by caste 
and status. They were to take special care in analyzing how these distinctions 
affected political relations among the groups concerned, and to note whether 
or not there were areas of existing or potential friction or conflict.
Military government personnel were also trained to observe and record 
the most important features of economic life. They were to focus on such 
matters as the dominant industries of the area, the division of labor and the 
kind and extent of international trade. They were also to pay careful attention 
to the labor supply -  to its size, skill and treatment, to its wages and 
organization, to the presence or absence of a labor movement. Novice 
administrators were also told to make note of patterns of land ownership -
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including size and distribution of tracts, forms of tenancy, and security of 
holdings. They were also to investigate the effects of government on everyday 
economic and social life -  especially regarding forms of taxation and public 
utilities and services.
Civil affairs personnel were also told to pay especially careful attention 
to how the areas they were to administer had been governed. Regarding this 
problem, graduates of the CATS and ASTP were to investigate such questions 
as the presence or absence of colonial government, and the degree of self- 
government and administration. They were to note the kinds of local political 
positions, the numbers and authority of each, how officials were selected, 
how they were organized, and the relations between central and local 
administration. Military government personnel were also to determine the 
relative importance of elections, tradition and status in the selection of 
officials. Other important issues about which they were to collect information 
concerned the presence or absence of political parties or groups, their types 
of organization, their methods of recruitment, their racial and social 
foundations, their intensity of feeling and their platforms or beliefs. Military 
governors were also to take note of the political theories and ideologies 
embraced by the local population, from American and British theories of 
democracy, to communism, fascism and international socialism.
Finally, civil affairs teams were to record the important features of 
family life, the relations between the sexes and between the generations. 
They were to note patterns of religious belief, major religious ceremonies 
and the use of special places and objects of worship. They were to investigate 
what was taught in schools, both general and technical. The local population’s 
degree of literacy, its reading habits and use of mass media (newspapers, 
radio) were also to be issues of concern to military governors.
In sum, the military’s Foreign Area and Language Program (FALP) 
attempted to train its soldiers to “see like a state” (Scott, 1998). In the 
process, the military sought to draw on insights from all the social science 
disciplines -  to provide civil affairs personnel with the skills they would 
need to generate a “total picture” of the area they were to administer (Matthews, 
1947:xii). The military sought to arm its administrators-in-training with insights 
and abilities that would make them sensitive to any and all conditions in a 
given area that might affect their ability to govern in an effective manner. In 
the words of anthropologist William Fenton, the Foreign Area and Language
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Curriculum “attempted rather uniquely to prepare soldiers for fieldwork of 
sorts in the civilizations (or cultures) of great areas” (Fenton, 1945:697).9
The military provided a clear rationale for providing its personnel 
with in-depth knowledge about the cultures and languages of strategically 
important areas of the globe: the maintenance of order. Invoking international 
law, the War Department argued that “it [was] the duty of the military 
commander of an occupied area to preserve, as far as military necessity 
[would] perm it, the established institutions and custom s” (US War 
Department n.d.a). “The ideal military government will [therefore] be one 
which can integrate the local laws, customs and economy of an occupied 
area and [...] superimpose military control with a minimum of disturbance 
to the former and a maximum of control by the latter” (US War Department 
n.d.b). “Military government is, in a sense, superstructure, erected over the 
local set-up” (Ibid).
Once the Foreign Area and Language Program curriculum had been 
reviewed, revised and approved by a second group of distinguished 
academics, as well as by the military director of the ASTP (Fenton, 1945), 
the Civil Affairs Division called upon the academic community as a whole to 
assist in training its future m ilitary governors.10 The response was 
overwhelming. Universities and colleges from all across the country stepped 
up to do their part. Shortly thereafter, in the spring of 1943, the Civil Affairs 
Division sent the standardized FALP curriculum to these schools, and asked 
that they use it as the basis for all their Foreign Area and Language Program 
course offerings. O f the 227 US institutions of higher learning that 
administered the ASTP, 55 offered the Foreign Area and Language curriculum. 
FALP training was provided at an additional ten universities, to officers who 
took part in the CATS.
As a result of these efforts to train adequate numbers of personnel 
for military government duty, there was something of an exodus of soldiers 
out of the barracks and into the classroom -  so much so that high-ranking 
officers in charge of combat operations became truly alarmed, and complained
9. William Fenton did an assessment of the FALP toward the end of the war, while it was still 
in progress. His study was published just after the war (see Fenton, 1945).
10. This “distinguished group of educators” had been nominated by the American Council on 
Education and the United States Office of Education (see Herge, 1948:30).
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about not having enough troops (Keefer, 1995). As a result, the Army 
established an annual cap of 150.000 on the number of personnel who could 
be enrolled in the ASTP. Although aggregate figures for the entire war are 
not available, in mid-October of 1943 there were about 129.000 soldiers 
enrolled in the Army Specialized Training Program, of whom 13.000 were 
taking the Foreign Area and Language Program.11 There are no comparable 
figures concerning the number of soldiers enrolled in the CATS at this time, 
but the vast majority also received FALP training. As these numbers suggest, 
social scientists from all disciplines participated in this effort, offering their 
expertise to train future military government administrators.
Just as the philanthropies had done prior to WW II, during the war 
the military self-consciously set out to craft a new form of knowledge -  
one that would contribute to its mission of re-establishing stability and 
normalcy in far-off lands, and of maintaining the health and well-being of 
their respective populations. The military did so by means of its Foreign 
Area and Language Program. Several features of the FALP curriculum are 
relevant to the present discussion. First, it emphasized the identity of area 
and language. Each area had a distinct language, and each language in turn 
implied an area with a distinctive cultural pattern. Not only did each area 
have its own cultural pattern or configuration, but this pattern could only be 
discerned by means of “integrated area study” . According to the armed 
forces, to get the “total picture” upon which successful military governance 
was based, it was necessary to draw on all the various academic disciplines 
that might have bearing on understanding the contemporary state of affairs 
in a given culture area. But simply drawing on the separate disciplines was 
not enough. It was necessary to integrate them -  to bring them together, so 
that each could benefit from the insights of the other. It was necessary to 
put the separate social science disciplines in direct dialogue with one another, 
so that they could produce a whole far greater tljan the sum of its parts.12
11. Of these 129.000 soldiers, 74.000 were studying basic engineering, 15.000 were studying 
advanced engineering, another 14.000 soldiers were studying medicine, an additional 
5.000 were being trained in dentistry and 2.000 in veterinary science. A full 13.000 were 
students of culture area and language (Keefer, 1988:69-70).
12. The army offered courses in a total of 32 languages, each with its accompanying area 
study program (Matthew, 1947:4).
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Symptomatic of the fact that the military found it necessary to create 
an entirely new form of knowledge at this time were the challenges it faced 
in doing so. Although several universities offered area studies programs 
prior to WW II, they were ill-suited to the needs of the military. Indeed, 
planners in the Division of Military Government bemoaned the fact that 
there was no model anywhere in academia for the integrated form of 
knowledge they desired. Existing programs were “non-integrated”. They 
presented knowledge of a region in terms of competing academic disciplines, 
with each discipline taught separately.
The military therefore found it necessary to intervene in the production 
of knowledge on an extensive basis in order to train its personnel -  just as 
the philanthropies had done during the 1920s and 1930s. Military planners 
felt compelled to intervene both in the organization of the disciplines and in 
the presentation of academic knowledge. Toward this end, the Division of 
Military Government assigned a coordinator to each school that offered 
FALP training. This individual was in charge of all aspects of the program 
on his campus. He was responsible for the mundane aspects of the program
-  the scheduling of classes and examinations. He also had more important 
duties. It was the coordinator who was responsible for ensuring that the 
otherwise disparate forms of disciplinary knowledge (anthropological, 
sociological etc.) cohered into a seamless, integrated whole.
To achieve this goal, the coordinator established new organizational 
forms and new modes of interaction. To begin, he convened a special planning 
group -  known as an “area committee” -  for each culture/language area to 
be taught at his campus. This committee consisted of an academic director 
(chosen by the coordinator), and at least one faculty m em ber from 
anthropology, sociology, economics, geography, political science and history. 
A representative of the language relevant to the area under consideration 
was considered essential to the group. Under the watchful eye of the 
coordinator, committee members designed courses that would address the 
general themes identified in the standardized, FALP curriculum (see above). 
They also planned the sequence of the lectures, and did the actual instruction 
of the culture area and language courses.
This procedure involved an unprecedented degree of cooperation 
among the participating departments. In many cases, because of the 
deliberations of the area committee, faculty ended up delivering lectures
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that they would not have given prior to the war, on topics that were not 
strictly disciplinary in nature. In large part, this occurred because lectures 
were submitted for review to the director of the area committee, or to the 
entire committee, before being delivered. The coordinator also reviewed the 
lesson plans and proposed lectures, and maintained close supervision over 
individual instructors. In other words, the committee and the coordinator 
exercised ongoing, corporate supervision over the entire progress of the 
area studies training program.13
Coordinators followed this procedure in part to ensure that members 
of a single area committee did not repeat the same material in presenting 
lectures. At the same time, however, discussion by the entire committee about 
educational materials normally presented in disciplinary form exposed each 
participant to perspectives and insights from all the other fields of study -  
thus encouraging integration. The integrated nature of instruction was further 
reinforced by the fact that coordinators insisted that the participating faculty 
attend and comment upon one another’s lectures. On the one hand, this meant 
that each faculty member was led to re-assess his own materials in light of 
what he learned from his colleagues. On the other hand, the collective 
understandings generated by this practice meant that the group as a whole 
could draw upon a shared base of knowledge in devising successive revisions 
of the entire course of study. The end result was a new set of procedures that 
encouraged the production of interdisciplinary knowledge.
The campus coordinator also introduced new ways of presenting 
and discussing educational materials that further contributed to the goal of 
integration. Especially important in this regard was the panel discussion, in 
which small groups of faculty, sometimes together with outside specialists, 
would draw out the implications of previous lectures, both for themselves 
and their students. Another novel approach that coordinators employed was 
what they called the interview technique, in which a “native informant” was 
brought to campus to be questioned by a group of faculty or students. 
Coordinators also employed the project technique, in which a number of 
students, operating as a team, were asked to draw upon insights from their 
readings and lectures to solve hypothetical problems of governance.
13. In practice, of course, these procedures were not always followed (see Fenton 1947).
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Implementing Areas: Civil Affairs in Action, 1942-45
Based on their training in the above-mentioned areas, and on language 
skills acquired as part of the same process, military personnel were expected 
to handle “the delicate problems of military government in occupied 
territories” (Matthew, 1947:5). Furthermore, they had to do so in conditions 
of considerable stress and danger, for they were required to take control of 
conquered territory immediately after the Army had landed. In many cases, 
military government personnel arrived together with the first wave of troops, 
when the bullets were still flying -  or immediately thereafter.
When Allied troops wrested control of North Africa from the Axis 
powers, for example, civil affairs teams were included along with regular 
combat troops. As the Allied front advanced across the desert, these teams set 
up command posts along the moving frontier (cf. Vincent, 1990), and in this 
way helped consolidate Allied control of new territories as soon as they were 
seized from the enemy (Rennell, 1948). When the Allies arrived in Sicily on 
July 10, 1943, and later in Corsica and southern Italy, civil affairs personnel 
were included in the first wave of assault (Coles and Weinberg, 1964). As 
combat troops advanced across Italy, steadily claiming more and more territory 
from the enemy, teams of administrators would immediately establish 
themselves as the new governing body.
In planning the Allied invasion of Normandy, on June 6, 1944, US 
General Eisenhower decided that civil affairs troops would be at too great a 
risk to be included in the first direct wave of assault (Coles and Weinberg, 
1964). Instead, wherever possible, in the days prior to the invasion civil 
affairs teams were dropped by parachute behind enemy lines, in secret, so 
that they would be poised to begin governing the very instant circumstances 
allowed (Donnison, 1961). On D-Day itself, civil affairs divisions were also 
dropped by parachute, in the second assault wave. As soon as they hit the 
ground these soldier-administrators raced by jeep to take control of each 
village, just moments after it had been liberated. In some cases they arrived 
ahead of regular combat troops to find German soldiers still packing up 
supplies in village town halls. Neither interfered with the other; the Germans 
would continue packing in one part of a city hall (after which they would 
leave), while civil affairs teams established themselves as the new government 
in another part of the same building (Edwards and Still, 1991). Military
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government personnel continued to play this same crucial role as the Allies 
advanced across France, through the German-occupied countries of northwest 
Europe, and into Germany itself (Coles and Weinberg, 1964; Donnison, 1961).
The reason that officers like General Eisenhower were so anxious to 
have civil affairs teams take up their duties as soon as humanly possible -  
and that these personnel were considered such an integral part of all invasion 
efforts -  was quite simple. It was abundantly clear to high-ranking military 
personnel that the US Army was far from being the only group vying for 
control of areas abandoned by the retreating Axis forces. Virtually everywhere 
the Allies attempted to establish themselves there were other pretenders to 
the throne -  groups with their own ideas about what was involved in returning 
to normalcy. In France, the Communist Party and General de Gaulle’s Free 
French movement had both laid careful plans to seize control over civil 
affairs once the Germans had retreated, and to do so prior to the Americans. 
In this way both groups hoped to establish themselves as the dominant 
pow er in post-w ar France (Edw ards and S till, 1991). In m uch of 
Mediterranean Europe, indeed in the whole of the continent, the military 
regarded communism as a grave threat -  and believed that, once combai 
operations were over, immediate action on the part of civil affairs personnel 
was necessary to forestall what was otherwise sure to be the immanen 
expansion of communist influence (Friedrich, 1948:20).
In Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Malaya, 
Indonesia, Thailand), the retreat of the Japanese appeared to the Allies to 
have opened up a political space that they would fill. Much to their dismay, 
they found that space already occupied. M ovements of anti-colonial 
nationalism, some of them quite radical, had emerged in most formei 
colonies. Many had declared independence prior to or simultaneous with 
the Japanese surrender, often before the return of the Allies.'4 In the formei 
French colonies, it was the Viet Minh in Vietnam and Cambodia and the Lao 
Issara (Free Laos) Movement in Laos that worked actively to prevent the
1 4 .The Allies being caught by surprise by the sudden nature o f the Japanese surrender -  
because of which Allied forces were not on hand in several parts of SE Asia (especially in 
Thailand) to actually accept the surrender directly from the Japanese. The European 
powers had planned to return to their former colonial domains in September or Octobei 
of 1945. The Japanese surrender came in August.
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return of the French. In the former British colonies it was the AFPFL (Anti- 
Fascist People’s Freedom League) in Burma and the MCP(Malayan Communist 
Party) in Malaya. In the Dutch East Indies, it was a broad coalition of nationalist, 
anti-colonial forces that sought to prevent the return of the Dutch.
These groups were determined to preserve their independence at any 
cost. Indeed, long before WW II many had become deeply hostile to European 
colonizing power. Anti-European sentiment ran sufficiently high that several 
(Vietnam, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia) hailed the Japanese as liberators from 
European colonial rule when the Japanese army arrived on the scene beginning 
in 1940. In other colonies (Ceylon, Malaya, Laos), important social elements 
conspired with the Japanese in an effort to drive the Europeans from power, 
or failed to warn the Europeans of immanent Japanese attack.
When the Pacific War finally came to a close in August of 1945, and 
it became clear that the Europeans intended to re-establish colonial control, 
pitched battles broke out in several locales. In Saigon and Djakarta, so serious 
was the opposition to renewed domination by Europeans that the British 
army, representing the other European colonizing powers, was only able to 
prevail over nationalist forces by employing large numbers of soldiers 
captured from Japan -  the recently-departed colonizing force. Elsewhere 
Malaya, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia), armed conflict did not 
mmediately break out. Instead, resistance movements crystallized or 
expanded to oppose the lingering presence of the Europeans. Many succeeded 
in bringing colonial rule to an end within a decade. Such were the stakes 
involved in struggles over civil affairs.
Indeed, the Allied powers realized from the outset that friendly 
governments would have to be created in most of the territories they intended 
to “liberate”, and that security concerns would therefore take precedence 
over all other considerations (Holborn, 1947). Creating new security regimes 
that could keep a close watch over everyday life squared nicely with the 
short- and long-term goals of the Allies. For example, the US War Department 
taught its civil affairs officers that “control of a nation’s civil administration 
would allow the US to [determine] its policies and spread [US] influence 
throughout liberated and invaded nations for decades to come” (US War 
Department n.d.a). Officer graduates of the university-based CATS, and of
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the School of Military Government in Charlottesville, “were told repeatedly 
that their first priorities were to further military objectives [...] to establish 
law and order” (US War Department n.d.a). They were taught that, whenever 
the stability of an area was in question -  whether the threat was “external” 
(Axis forces) or “internal” (communist or socialist groups, labor organizations 
etc.), whether it stemmed from insecure food supplies or general lawlessness
-  they were to take a series of steps to protect the general well-being, and to 
guarantee continued US control.
Civil affairs personnel were told to guard against external threats by 
patrolling all borders with great care (especially in the early stages of the 
occupation), to ensure that control of territory remained intact. Thereafter, 
they were to limit population movement across borders and carefully monitor 
whatever population movement did take place.15 As complex as these tasks 
were, however, military government personnel were advised that guarding 
against internal threats was even more challenging. To do so, civil affairs 
teams were ordered to disband political organizations of all kinds, and to 
prohibit political activity in general. In the interest of stability, they were to 
impose martial law, and to suspend civil liberties. Such liberties as the local 
population would be allowed were never to interfere with the overriding 
need to maintain order.16
The risk of internal threat or instability could be further minimized by 
ensuring that the population had stable, reliable access to supplies of food, 
clothing, medicine etc. Toward this end, wherever they deemed it necessary, 
civil affairs teams were to re-organize economic affairs. They were to seize 
control of all important stores of essential items, and to oversee their 
distribution to the general population. They were also to take command of 
the provision of key services (drinking water, electrical power, policing, 
public sanitation), administrative activities (maintenance of property registers,
15. For Allied policy concerning population movement, see Report on the Tripartite Conference 
o f Potsdam, August 2, 1945, “The Political and Economic Principles to Govern the 
T reatm ent o f Germany in the Initial Control Period; Orderly Transfers o f German 
Populations” (Holborn, 1947:204-205); American Directive on the Military Government 
o f  Austria, June 27, 1945, Part I, General and Political, Section 19, “Treatm ent of 
Displaced Persons and Refugees in Austria” (Holborn, 1947:185).
16. See documents in previous note.
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vital statistics offices etc.) and banking functions. Military government 
personnel were also to forbid the use of inflated, war-time currency, and 
were to replace it with money issued by the military.17
To ensure that key elements of infrastructure (roads, bridges, railroads, 
irrigation works, public water and sewage systems) were repaired and 
maintained, the interim military government was to organize work gangs from 
amongst the local population, and was to recompense the workers in military 
money (Rundell, 1980). To protect private property and personal safety, and 
to maintain stability, curfews were to be established and strictly enforced. 
Roads were to be sealed, roadblocks established, and the movement of the 
population kept to a bare minimum. In those rare instances where people 
were allowed to be mobile, their movements were to be carefully monitored.
The instructions issued to civil affairs personnel in May, 1944, for 
subsequent use in France (after D-Day), are not atypical of the directives 
issued to military government officers in general. According to these 
instructions, civil affairs teams were to pursue the following, strategic 
objective^ (Edwards and Still, 1991:25-26):
1. restoration and maintenance of law and order.
2. guarantee of a steady supply of food and other goods.
3. coordination of reconstruction projects, using local labor.
4. priority of military requirements over civil rights.
5. dissolution of all pro-enemy political parties and organizations.
6. prohibition on political activity.
7. freedom of movement and association suspended.
8. allied control of local police.
9. restoration of all prewar laws.
10. media and mail censorship.
11. providing food, clothing, medical care, fuel, etc.
12. wage and price controls.
13. general control of economy, including banks [and] the issuance 
of occupation francs.
1 7 .Relevant documents include the following: Combined Directive on Military Government 
in Sicily, May 31, I943\ Revised Financial Guide fo r  Germany, Combined Directive fo r  
M ilitary G overnm ent in Germany P rior to D efeat or Surrender, A pril IS, 1944\ 
Memorandum No. 2 Relating to France, Directives and Agreements on Civil Affairs in 
France, August 25, I944\ all to be found in Holborn (1947); for a general discussion of 
military money see Rundell (1980).
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14. establishing a curfew.
15. set-up road blocks.
16. no civilian use of telephones or mail.
Because of the highly “ideological” commitments of the peoples who 
had so recently been living under the Axis yoke, the overwhelming emphasis 
of Allied military government was on order -  on controlling and stabilizing 
living conditions within areas with carefully specified, clearly demarcated 
boundaries. Knowledge about language and culture was important because 
it helped make such control possible.
Area Studies in War and Peace
It would be a mistake to view the military version of area studies as 
a form of knowledge and control that is relevant only to understanding the 
rather specialized conditions of the Second World War, with no application 
to the peace that followed. As noted above, the peace-time iteration of area 
studies —  which consolidated during the Cold War -  was in fact first 
articulated during WWII, and had much in common with its military relative. 
Indeed, the preoccupation with the cultural characteristics of distinct world 
areas that dominated the social sciences after the war stemmed from the 
same concerns that focused the attention of military planners on this issue 
during the war itself.
The Second World War forged new institutional linkages between 
the US government, academics, and the organizations that sponsored the 
production of academic knowledge (especially the three main academic 
councils —  the SSRC and the ACLS and the NRC [National Research 
Council]). William Donovan, head of the new Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS, the war-time equivalent of and the precursor to the CIA), played a 
key role in establishing these linkages. In 1941 he decided to draw on the 
academic community to assemble a strong team of intelligence experts to 
contribute to the war effort. Donovan invited representatives of the SSRC 
and the ACLS to help him draw up a “slate of academic advisors” for this 
purpose (Cumings, 1997; Katz, 1989). By the time he was done, Donovan
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had compiled a list of hundreds -  leading academics and young scholars 
alike.18 Many of these individuals went on to play a key role in intelligence 
activities during the fight against fascism and communism.
The war-time bonds established between the government, social 
scientists and the academic councils were to prove strong and enduring. In 
addition to cooperating with OSS Director Donovan on intelligence in the 
narrow sense, the SSRC and the ACLS also began working collaboratively 
with the US military and intelligence communities to expand the conventional 
meaning of intelligence way beyond its normal bounds (Fenton, 1947; Hall, 
1947; Matthew, 1947; SSRC, 1942-43; SSRC, 1943-44). The Councils 
argued that, in light of the direct responsibilities the US was about to assu­
me for the well being of the entire planet (sic!), knowledge about other 
peoples and places in every corner of the globe should be considered a 
matter of “intelligence”. Furthermore, the Councils asserted, the US was 
sorely lacking in the expertise necessary to gather this intelligence -  as a 
result of which the country had put its interests at great risk.
Such was the conclusion of the SSRC’s Committee on World Regions, 
in a June, 1943 report entitled “World Regions in the Social Sciences” 
(Hamilton, 1943). After having shown no interest whatsoever in bounded 
regional cultures during the previous fifteen years, in early 1943 the SSRC 
formed this committee “to scrutinize the implications of the government’s 
training programs for service in foreign regions” (SSRC, 1942-43:49). In 
other words, the SSRC was intensely interested in the military’s Foreign 
Area and Language Program.
The influence of the armed forces’ Foreign Area and Language 
Program on the SSRC’s conception of the need for cultural intelligence 
experts is striking. In March of 1943 the military began using the FALP to 
train military police who could draw on knowledge of culture and language 
to address immediate problems of security in occupied lands. In June of 
that same year, the SSRC proposed a sweeping reorganization of US education 
intended to equip social scientists and other interested parties with the cultural 
and linguistic expertise required to address the long-term security concerns 
of the US in the post-war world.
18 .This figure includes a scattering of professionals in non-academic fields.
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Drawing on a conceptualization that was virtually identical to the 
military’s FALC, the SSRC proposed that all the peoples and cultures of 
the world be brought into a single ordering schema in which the constituent 
units were discrete, bounded cultural regions.19 “World Regions” identified 
(in general terms) the kind of intelligence that should be gathered about 
these regional units. It also provided a rationale for ranking the regions, 
according to their geopolitical significance. Finally, the report suggested 
how to train experts who could generate the much-needed intelligence 
about these regions.
What emerges out of the “World Regions” document is nothing less 
a plan for the peace-time institutionalization of the m ilitary’s war-time 
geography of knowledge. The report begins by arguing that the rapidly 
changing geopolitical concerns of the US called for the production of a new 
kind of knowledge on an unprecedented scale (Hamilton, 1943:1; see also 
Robinson, 2004; Wallerstein, 1997):
The present war has focused attention as never before upon the entire world. 
Interest in foreign regions has been intensified and sharp attention drawn to 
areas over which we have felt little or no concern... The immediate need for 
social scientists who know the different regions of the world stands second only 
to the demand for military and naval officers familiar with the actual and potential 
combat zones. Since few overseas areas have hitherto attracted research, we lack 
the regional knowledge now required [...1 The consequent scarcity of professional 
and scientific personnel combining linguistic and regional knowledge with technical 
proficiency seriously hampers every war agency.
The SSRC report went on to argue that the need for a greatly expanded 
corpus of knowledge about unfolding conditions around the globe was 
anything but limited to the period of the war itself. Rather, once the fighting
19. In addition to the slate of academic advisors to the OSS mentioned in the text, the SSRC, 
the ACLS, and the National Research Council (all the creations of the great philanthropies) 
all established area committees during the war, “when detailed knowledge and experts on 
virtually every area of the world were in heavy demand” (Hall, 1947;iii). These committees 
joined with the Smithsonian Institution to form the Ethnogeographic Board, which 
helped coordinate the activities of academics so that they contributed as effectively as 
possible to the war effort (cf. Farish, 2005; Fenton, 1945).
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came to an end the safety and security of US interests abroad would depend 
critically on the continued production of such knowledge (Hamilton, 1943:2):
Our need for comprehensive knowledge of other lands will not end with the 
armistice or reconstruction. No matter what shape international organization 
may assume, the US will enjoy unparalleled opportunities and face heavy 
responsib ilities. The ease, speed, and cheapness o f com m unication and 
transportation will tend to promote economic, political and cultural relations 
among nations. Trade, shipping, air lines, the press, mining, the production and 
d istribution  o f petroleum , banking, governm ent serv ice, industry and 
communications will require thousands of Americans who combine thorough 
professional or technical training with knowledge of the languages, economics, 
politics, history, geography, peoples, customs and religions of foreign countries.
On this basis the SSRC called for a sweeping reorganization of education 
in the US to provide the expertise required to meet the new exigencies of 
empire. According to the “World Regions” report (Hamilton, 1943:2):
In order that we may fulfill our postwar role fin the worldl our citizens must 
know other lands and appreciate their people, cultures, and institutions. Research, 
graduate teaching, undergraduate instruction, and elementary education in world 
regions will be desirable as far as one can see into the future.
Although foundation planners recommended that US education as a 
whole be revamped to train the experts needed to manage US imperial 
domains, the special focus of reform efforts should be the creation of new 
institutes in major universities that could provide advanced training in each 
of the world’s major areas (Hamilton, 1943:6):
In any development for the study of world regions in this country, the first step 
should be the establishment of university centers for research and graduate 
instruction. These centers will extend our knowledge of the major areas of the 
world: supply government and business with experts; and provide materials and 
teachers for lower levels of instruction [...] The graduate-research centers alone, 
[however,] will not meet the needs of our country. The benefits o f regional 
instruction must permeate our entire educational system. America will not be 
able to assume her [global] economic, political, and cultural responsibilities f...l 
after the war without enlarged spatial concepts and a more comprehensive 
knowledge of the world.
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Discussions about the relation between area knowledge and the 
security of empire continued after the war. A combination of Cold War 
politics and decolonization movements in Africa and Asia seemed to threaten 
US interests on all sides, and reinforced the wartime conviction that 
knowledge about seemingly far-off people and places did indeed have a 
strategic dimension.
In this context, high-ranking officials at the Ford and Rockefeller 
Foundations and at the Carnegie Endowment arranged a series of meetings 
to discuss what was to be done (Szanton, 2004:9). They agreed that the 
US had to greatly enhance its capacity to “understand and act effectively 
in previously unfamiliar nations and societies all across the globe” (Ibid). 
A new cadre of specially trained personnel with expertise in the various 
regions of the world was required, foundation officials agreed, “to promote 
capitalist development, [...] to achieve social and political stability and to 
secure US interests” (Ibid).
In the late 1940s the foundations began to make good on this vision. 
In 1947 the SSRC published a new report reiterating the strategic importance 
of area knowledge (Hall, 1947).20 The following year area studies got off to 
a modest beginning when the Carnegie Endowment helped the SSRC launch 
its first program of area studies research and training (Robinson, 2004:137). 
As the Cold War heated up during the 1950s, Joint SSRC/ACLS Committees 
that focused on specific world areas (Latin America, Africa etc.) came to 
dominate the funding activities of both organizations, and continued to do 
so for decades. W ith generous financial support p rovided  by the 
philanthropies, these Committees were instrumental in making area studies 
the dominant perspective in the social sciences.
It was the Ford Foundation, however, that ultimately assumed the 
most important role in institutionalizing the military’s war-time geography 
of knowledge. At the dawn of the Cold War Ford embarked on a project of 
truly massive proportions to create a new infrastructure of training, research 
and publishing in the social sciences. Using the two SSRC reports on world
20. The same year that the SSRC published its second report stressing the importance of area 
knowledge (1947), the US Congress passed the National Security Act. This act of Congress 
authorized the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, an organization that had close 
ties with the major foundations (especially Ford) and with the area studies centers that the 
foundations helped build.
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regions/area studies as a sort of loose blueprint, Ford’s D ivision of 
International Training and Research (1952) began building interdisciplinary, 
advanced-degree-granting Area Studies Institutes at major universities 
throughout the US (Mitchell, 2004). By 1966, when Ford discontinued this 
program, it had succeeded in building Institutes at 34 leading universities, 
and had spent $120 million dollars on the endeavor (Szanton, 2004: l l ) .21 At 
the cost of an additional $150 million dollars, Ford subsidized the training, 
fieldwork and write-up of several thousand social science graduate students, 
who were steeped in the area studies framework.
As the foregoing suggests, it is not mere coincidence that there are 
such strong similarities between area studies in war and peace. Both were 
conceived of early in WW II, almost simultaneously, in anticipation of the 
expanded role the US would assume in world affairs at the end of the war 
and during the post-war era. The moment the actual fighting came to an 
end, the war-time version of area studies -  in the context of military 
government -  was critical in establishing US control over vast new sections 
of the globe. Once order had been established, the peace-time iteration of 
area studies -  in the context of Cold War geopolitics -  was intended to help 
maintain the position that the US had established by means of military 
conquest. In other words, area studies in war was designed to help address 
the short-term security concerns of US military government. Area studies 
in peace was meant to serve the long-term security interests of Cold War, 
global governmentality. In the words of its corporate sponsors, Cold War 
area studies was intended “to promote capitalist development [...] to achieve 
social and political stability and to secure US interests” (Szanton, 2004:9).
21. These figures do not include the considerable sums of money that Ford and the other great 
philanthropies spent on building institutions of higher learning in the non-Western world.
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Conclusion
Two decades ago Paul Rabinow made the interesting observation 
that the taboo against specifying the power relations involved in the production 
of anthropological texts was “much greater than the strictures against 
denouncing colonialism” (Rabinow, 1986:253). He went on to call for a 
careful exploration of the politics of the academy -  of the complex constraints 
within which anthropological knowledge is produced and received (Bond, 
1990:287). In closing, I would like to paraphrase Rabinow by suggesting 
that we focus not only on texts, but on the power relations involved in the 
production of anthropology itself. Anthropologists have much to gain, I 
would argue, by extending their gaze beyond the politics of the academy to 
consider the multiple ways that their discipline is embedded in the power 
relations of the world writ large. It is not just that these power relations 
represent the essential conditions of possibility of anthropological research
-  that most anthropological fieldwork and scholarship since WW II, for 
example, has taken place in a global arena whose geographic limits were 
defined directly by the outcome of the war -  and whose economic 
organization and socio-political dynamics were deeply affected by the 
institutions established to manage the post-war world (the Bretton Woods 
institutions, the C.I.A., a global network of US military bases etc.). Nor is it 
just that these institutions have helped make (parts of) the world safe for 
anthropology. Equally important is the fact that these same power relations 
have been deeply involved in the very constitution of anthropological practice. 
As I have argued in this paper, it was the immediate security concerns of 
military government in WW II that led army officers and university professors 
into unprecedented relationships that reconfigured how the world was to be 
conceived and managed -  by social scientists and military personnel alike. It 
was the longer-term security concerns of the Cold War era that led foundation 
officials (and later, the US government) to continue what the military had 
begun -  the creation of a new social science infrastructure and a new 
geography of knowledge (area studies), one that had little if anything in 
common with pre-war approaches to social processes.
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At the time that Paul Rabinow appealed to anthropologists to analyze 
the politics of the academy, much ink was spilt in debates concerning reflexive 
anthropology (Clifford and Marcus; Marcus and Fischer, 1986). I would like 
to suggest that, interesting and important though these discussions were, they 
missed entire dimensions of reflexivity. First, they failed to reflect upon why 
the US has been at the intellectual and institutional center of anthropology 
during the 20th century -  why there is so much anthropology to reflect upon 
in the first place. Second, these debates showed little awareness of the 
distinctive assemblages of institutions and relationships that have produced 
different forms of anthropology as the 20th century has progressed. Finally, 
the discussions of the 1980s paid scant attention to the forces that have molded 
and shaped the very conceptual categories that anthropologists employ. The 
present paper has sought to open a discussion of these issues, and is offered 
as a preliminary foray into a revised, or new reflexive anthropology.
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Abstract
The Second World War marks an important but unacknowledged 
watershed in the history of the social sciences in the US. During the war 
army officers and university professors all across the country entered into 
a series of unprecedented relationships that transformed how the world 
was to be conceived and managed for decades to come. The product of 
their collaboration was the first comprehensive implementation of the area 
studies framework. It was the exigencies of military rule -  the desire to 
impose control over and stability within the extensive territories being 
“liberated” from Axis control -  that led the military to seek out the expertise 
of the academy. Between them, military planners and social scientists 
developed an entirely new conceptual framework that facilitated direct 
territorial administration of diverse peoples living in scattered, war-torn 
regions. By the end of the war, the new area studies framework had been 
employed in the armed forces’ efforts to order and administer the lives of 
over 300 million people around the globe -  more than 10% of the world’s 
population. After the war, the area studies framework became the dominant 
paradigm in the social sciences in the US.
Resumo
A Segunda Guerra M undial marca um im portante, mas pouco 
reconhecido divisor de águas na história das ciências sociais nos Estados 
Unidos. Durante a guerra, oficiais do exército e professores universitários em 
todo o país envolveram-se numa série de relações sem precedentes que 
transformaram a maneira de conceber e gerenciar o mundo e que vigeu durante 
décadas. Essa colaboração resultou na primeira implementação abrangente do 
esquema para os estudos de área. Foram as exigências militares -  o desejo de 
impor controle e estabilidade em extensos territórios que eram “liberados” 
pelo Eixo -  que levaram os militares a procurar especialistas na academia. 
Juntos, os planificadores militares e os cientistas sociais, desenvolveram um 
esquema conceituai inteiramente novo que facilitou a administração direta dos 
povos que viviam em regiões dispersas e devastadas pela guerra. Ao final do 
conflito, esse novo esquema de estudos de área havia sido empregado pelas 
Forças Armadas em seu esforço de disciplinar e administrar as vidas de mais 
de 300 milhões de pessoas em todo o mundo, ou seja, mais de 10% da população 
mundial. Depois da guerra, os estudos de área tomaram-se o paradigma 
dominante nas ciências sociais estadunidenses.
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